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SPF, DKIM and DMARC, Explained for Owners
If you've read our post on the email settings carriers check, you know that three public records, SPF, DKIM and DMARC, decide how easy it is for a criminal to send email that appears to come from your company. This post goes one level deeper: what each record does, how to tell where you stand, and how to get to full protection without breaking your own email.
You won't need to type any of these records yourself. But you'll be able to ask the right questions and recognize a good answer.
The problem these records solve
Email was designed decades ago, when the internet was a small network of people who trusted each other. The "From" address on a message is just text, and anyone can write anything there. Out of the box, nothing stops a stranger from sending a message that says it's from your CFO, to your customer, asking them to pay an invoice to a new account.
SPF, DKIM and DMARC are the fixes that were added later. They let the receiving mail system check whether a message really came from the domain it claims to. All three are published in your domain's DNS, the public directory that tells the internet where your website and email live.
SPF: the list of approved senders
SPF (Sender Policy Framework) is a published list of the servers and services allowed to send email for your domain. When a message arrives claiming to be from you, the receiver checks whether it came from one of those approved senders.
Think of it as a guest list at the door. If you send email through Microsoft 365, a newsletter service and an invoicing system, all three need to be on the list.
SPF has limits. It checks a technical sending address that the recipient never sees, not the "From" line people read, and it can break when email is forwarded. That's why it isn't enough on its own.
DKIM: a tamper-evident seal
DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) adds a digital signature to each message you send. The receiver checks the signature against a public key published in your DNS. If it matches, the message really was sent by a system you authorized, and it wasn't altered on the way.
Think of it as a wax seal on a letter. Each service that sends email for you, such as Microsoft 365, Google Workspace or your marketing tool, has its own signing key, and each needs to be set up.
DMARC: the instructions and the reports
DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance) is the record that ties the other two together. It does three things:
- It checks alignment. DMARC requires that the domain in the visible "From" line matches the domain that passed SPF or DKIM. That closes the gap that SPF alone leaves open.
- It tells receivers what to do with failures. That instruction is called the policy, and it has three settings:
- none: deliver failures normally, but report them.
- quarantine: send failures to spam.
- reject: refuse failures outright.
- It asks for reports. Receivers like Gmail and Outlook send summary reports showing which servers sent email using your domain, and whether those messages passed. Those reports are how you find every legitimate sender before you tighten the policy.
DMARC.org has background if you want it, and both Microsoft and Google publish setup guides for their platforms.
Why it matters beyond fraud
These records also affect whether your legitimate email arrives. Large mailbox providers increasingly expect them. Google's sender guidelines, for example, require bulk senders to have SPF, DKIM and DMARC in place. A company without them may find its invoices and proposals landing in spam more often.
How to tell where you stand
Ask your IT person or provider these questions for each domain you own:
- Is there an SPF record, and does it list every service that sends email for us?
- Is DKIM signing turned on in our email platform, and in every other service that sends as us?
- Is there a DMARC record, and what's the policy: none, quarantine or reject?
- Who receives and reads the DMARC reports?
Many free online lookup tools will show you the public records for any domain if you'd like to see for yourself. Since anyone can look them up, your insurer and your customers can see the same thing.
Getting from "none" to "reject" without breaking anything
The path is the same for almost every company, and it's measured in weeks:
Step 1: Inventory your senders. List every system that sends email as your domain: your main email platform, marketing and newsletter tools, invoicing and accounting software, HR and payroll systems, the website contact form, scanners and copiers, ticketing and support tools.
Step 2: Publish DMARC at "none" with reporting turned on. Nothing changes for your mail, but reports start arriving.
Step 3: Fix each legitimate sender. Use the reports to find services that fail, and set up SPF and DKIM for each. A DMARC reporting service can turn the raw reports, which are hard to read, into a simple dashboard.
Step 4: Move to quarantine. Once the reports show your real mail passing consistently, tighten the policy. Some companies start by applying it to a percentage of messages and increasing it.
Step 5: Move to reject. Now forgeries are refused outright. Keep watching the reports, and add any new sending service properly before it goes live.
When I ran IT at a company of about 200 people, the technical part of this was never the slow part. The slow part was discovering the senders nobody had mentioned, such as the department that had signed up for its own email tool. A short note to department heads asking, "Does anything you use send email as us?" saves a lot of guesswork.
Domains that never send email
Most companies own a few domains that don't send email at all: old company names, defensive registrations, product sites. Those should be locked down explicitly with an SPF record that authorizes no senders and a DMARC policy of reject. It takes minutes and closes a door criminals actively look for.
What to do Monday morning
- Ask for a list of every domain your company owns, and the current SPF, DKIM and DMARC status of each.
- Ask department heads to name every tool that sends email as the company, and give that list to IT.
- If DMARC is missing, have it published at "none" with reports going to someone who will read them.
- If DMARC is stuck at "none," ask for a dated plan to reach quarantine and then reject.
- Lock down unused domains with a no-senders SPF record and a reject policy.